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ABSTRACT 
The whole world is in some way affected by terrorism. It has many faces, 
different causes, and comes about by distinct ways around the globe. As a 
consequence, in the Brazilian Tri-border Area (TBA) terrorism has its own 
characteristics. In the TBA, terrorist groups are focused on supporting activities 
for their organizations.  
The problems related to terrorism in the TBA are connected with the 
struggle between Arabs and Israelis in the Middle East. Terrorist groups, such as 
Hezbollah and HAMAS, have operatives in the TBA in order to raise money and 
provide logistics to support their groups. In addition, these supporting activities 
are, as a rule, criminal efforts.  
So in the TBA, the best statecraft instrument to combat terrorism is law 
enforcement.  In the Triple Frontier crime is the center of gravity for terrorism, 
and, as a consequence, the police are the most capable agency to deal with this 
situation. They can better prosecute organizations that perpetrate crimes to 
support terrorist groups.  
Hence, Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay must develop a strategic law 
enforcement approach to combat terrorism, based on ends, ways and means, 
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The whole world is in some way affected by terrorism.  Although it has 
different faces across the globe, and expresses itself in different ways, terrorism 
is a phenomenon1 which sometimes occurs as a strategy,2 or sometimes as a 
tactic,3 that comes about with the use of violence or the threat of violence to 
generate fear among the citizenry, and disestablish the regime in order to 
achieve political goals.4  Around the globe one can find different kinds of groups 
that use terrorism to accomplish political ends, such as the Euskadi Ta 
Askatasuna or ETA (Basque for Basque Homeland and Freedom) in Spain, the 
Irish Republican Army (IRA) in England, the Aryan Nation in the United States, 
the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines, and the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan or 
PKK (Kurdish for Kurdistan Workers Party) in parts of south-eastern Turkey, 
north-eastern Iraq, north-eastern Syria and north-western Iran.  In all these 
places terrorism, sometimes domestic, sometimes transnational, is present 
creating its innocent victims and spreading fear throughout the civil population. 
In South America, terrorism has its own type of expression. It is most often 
linked to criminal activities and most terrorists have distinct connections with 
organized crime.  In the post 9-11 era there are two relevant regions in South 
America that face terrorism, namely Colombia and the Tri-border Area (TBA).  
The first confronts the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército 
del Pueblo or FARC-EP (Spanish for Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia–
                                            
1 Lindsay Clutterbuck, Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy (Washington, D.C.: 
Georgetown University Press, 2004), 141. 
2 Ivan Arreguin-Toft, “How the Weak Win Wars. A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict,” International Security 
26, no. 1 (2001): 103. 
3 Stephen D. Biddle, “American Grand Strategy After 9/11: An Assessment,” (2005) 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB603.pdf [accessed September 30, 2006]. 
4 Peter C. Sederberg, “Conciliation as Counter-Terrorist Strategy,” Journal of Peace Research 32, no. 3 
(1995): 296. 
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People's Army5), a former insurgent group, which originated from an ideological 
revolutionary movement.  Nowadays, however, the FARC-EP is a guerrilla group 
strictly concerned with political goals in the Colombian territory using terrorism as 
a tool to achieve its objectives.  Moreover, the FARC-EP today is far from its 
ideological roots and does not need popular support to sustain itself, obtaining its 
funds from criminal activities.  The relationship between the FARC-EP (terrorist-
guerrilla organization) and organized crime (drug trafficking) is a pragmatic 
arm’s-length relationship.  The FARC-EP provides security and safe havens for 
narco-trafficking, and the drug dealers finance FARC-EP in support of its terrorist 
activities. 
The Tri-border Area (TBA) by Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay has other 
peculiarities that link the area with terrorism and organized crime.  Terrorism in 
the TBA is necessarily associated with its supporting activities.  The bottom line 
is that the terrorist organizations Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya or HAMAS 
(Arabic for Islamic Resistance Movement), Hezbollah (Arabic for Party of God) 
and Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (Arabic for the Islamic Group) have operatives inside 
the TBA to provide funding and logistics to their terrorist endeavors.  
Consequently, the actors involved in the TBA scenario are different from those 
found in others regions of South America, like Colombia.  In the TBA, they are 
related to religious terrorism6 inspired by Islamic extremism, and linked to the 
struggle in the Middle East between radical Arabs and regimes supported by 
Western states, like Israel and Egypt.  Hence, the terrorist operatives in the TBA 
are not part of the Global Salafi Jihad.7  In addition, they are connected to 
assorted types of crimes, such as smuggling, credit card fraud and money 
laundering in order to support their terrorist operations. 
                                            
5 Mark P. Sullivan, “Latin America: Terrorism Issues,” CRS Report for Congress, January 18, 2006, 2. 
6 David C. Rapoport et al., Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy (Washington, D.C.: 
Georgetown University Press, 2004), 61. 
7 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2004), 61. 
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The roots of this link between organized crime and terrorism in the 
Brazilian TBA are deep-seated.  This thesis argues that there are three factors 
which prompted terrorism in the Brazilian TBA:  the end of Cold War, a former 
lack of stricter state efforts in the area, and Arab immigration.  During the Cold 
War, terrorist organizations were broadly sponsored by states8 that used those 
groups to affect their enemy in an oblique way.  Thus, terrorist groups were 
financed and supported by state sponsorship.  However, since the bankruptcy of 
the Soviet Union and, consequently, the end of the Cold War, terrorist groups 
have become an unnecessary tool of statecraft9 in the new international order.  
On the other hand, today it is still possible to find states that support terrorist 
organizations, such as Iran and Syria10, which sponsor terrorist groups like 
HAMAS and Hezbollah.  Consequently, the decline in the ability of state 
sponsorship led terrorist groups to rise their own funding and manage logistics on 
criminal bases. 
 
Figure 1. The Tri-Border Area in the Circle. 11 
 
                                            
8 Glenn E. Curtis and Tara Karacan, “The Nexus Among Terrorists, Narcotics Traffickers, Weapons 
Proliferators, and Organized Crime Networks in Western Europe,” Library of Congress, Federal Research 
Division, 2002. 
9 Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Shrewd Sanctions, Statecraft and State Sponsors of Terrorism (Washington, 
DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003). 
10 David Tucker, Skirmishes at the Ede of Empire: The United States and International Terrorism 
(Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1997), 76. 
11 Jeffrey Fields, “Islamist Terrorist Threat in the Tri-Border Region,” Center for Nonproliferation 
Studies (CNS), Monterey Institute of International Studies, (October, 2002)  
http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_16a.html [accessed September 29, 2006]. 
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During the 1980’s and early 1990’s, developments in the TBA area were 
not a priority, in terms of security, to the countries that form the region.  
Consequently, proliferation of criminal activities was consolidated in the TBA.  
During that period, smuggling was inserted in the local culture, and it was not 
seen as an organized crime effort.  As a matter of fact, smuggling, regarding its 
criminal condition, was seen as a mere “irregularity” by the population and the 
authorities.  The consequence was that “innocuous” illicit activity (smuggling) 
attracted other illegal pursuits, and soon the TBA became a place where criminal 
organizations developed drug trafficking; weapons trafficking; piracy of all sorts of 
goods; money laundering; credit card fraud; clandestine phone communications; 
counterfeiting of passports, identification documents (I.D.) and international flight 
tickets; false marriages; and child adoptions.  This criminal environment became 
very appealing to terrorist groups, which could raise funds there to support their 
cause. 
The immigration of Arabs into the TBA is another element that has 
fomented the connection between organized crime and terrorist organizations.  In 
the TBA, the Arab community could find a place to develop its traditional 
business in commerce without worries about discrimination, and many Arabs 
were attracted by the local “smuggling culture” that could promote opportunities 
to make “easy money.”  This agglomeration of Arabs, most of them from 
Lebanon, allowed the infiltration into their community of individuals linked to 
terrorist organizations, most commonly Hezbollah and HAMAS.  Such an 
environment allowed the rise of organized crime as the center of gravity for 
terrorism in the Brazilian TBA. 
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate that the best response to 
terrorism in the Brazilian TBA is a response based on law enforcement with a 
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strategic approach of ways, means and ends12 in order to diminish terrorist 
activities. That resolution comes from the following syllogism: crime is the center 
of gravity (COG) for terrorism in the Brazilian TBA.  The best response to crime is 
law enforcement efforts. 
Therefore, law enforcement efforts are the best response to terrorism in 
the Brazilian TBA.  Terrorist organizations have their operatives in the TBA just 
because they realize that in such an area they will be able to raise funding and 
logistics to benefit themselves.  Furthermore, those supporting activities are 
developed on an illegal basis; consequently crime activities are the reasons that 
justify the presence of terrorist groups in the TBA.  So, if one can disrupt this 
connection between organized crime and supporting of terrorist organizations in 
the TBA, terrorist activities in this area will be as forceless as possible.  In this 
context law enforcement13 conducting a coordinated counterterrorist effort in the 
three sides of the TBA will be the appropriated state instrument to combat 
terrorism. 
C. RELEVANCE 
Unfortunately, the Brazilian TBA is still considered a safe haven14 for 
terrorists in South America.  But there are few assessments concerning the 
essence and the genesis of the problems related to terrorism in the TBA.  
Furthermore, there are no studies about responses that have been made to the 
problem, and what things must be worked on to change that paradigm.  
Consequently, to present the real dimensions and boundaries about terrorist 
activities in the Brazilian TBA and to offer the correct responses to confront them 
is highly relevant.  So, by analyzing the reasons that explain why terrorist 
                                            
12 Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., “Toward an Understanding of Military Strategy,” in U.S. Army War College 
Guide to Strategy, ed. Joseph R. Cerami and James F. Holcomb, Jr., (February 2001), 179. 
13 Thomas O’Connor, “The integration of Homeland Security and Law Enforcement,” (2004) 
http://faculty.ncwc.edu/toconnor/427/427lect07.htm  [accessed May 31, 2006]. 
14 Rex Hudson, “Terrorist and Organized Crime Groups in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of South 
America,” The Library of Congress, Federal Research Division (July 2003), 68. 
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organizations act in the Brazilian TBA and what must be done to combat those 
groups, Brazil and the international community can reach a plausible solution in 
dealing with terrorism in the TBA. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will follow four methodological steps.  First, the causes of 
terrorism in the Brazilian TBA will be analyzed. It will be done through a historical 
approach focused on relevant historic events in the international arena and inside 
the TBA.  Second, the problem related to terrorism in the Brazilian TBA will be 
delineated and its real dimensions will be defined.  Then, the limits of the 
problem that involve the nexus between organized crime and terrorism will be 
studied, and how this relationship works within the TBA. At this point a critical 
case study15 with strategic importance in relation to the problem will be used to 
illustrate and to clarify the deeper causes of organized crime and terrorism.  
Lastly, this thesis will present the appropriate response to the problem of 
terrorism which challenges the TBA’s countries and the international community. 
                                            
15 Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1997), 49. 
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II. TERRORISM IN THE BRAZILIAN TRI-BORDER AREA (TBA) 
One of the most important steps in a political science study is to identify 
the historical causes of a problem that has been analyzed.  If an analyst is just 
concerned with the exterior effects (consequences) of a problem, he or she will 
just touch its surface, and will repeat only the conventional wisdom about it.  
Hence, one can say that to better understand a complex situation it is necessary, 
but not sufficient, to point out how the facts are presented and who the actors 
involved in it are.  The analyst must go further.  He or she has to investigate the 
root of the problem and the reasons that drive the actors to play their roles in 
such an arena in order to establish the real boundaries that surround it. 
Consequently, when scholars16 argue that there is terrorism in the 
Brazilian TBA17 but do not demonstrate the historical reasons of this 
phenomenon and its limits, this assessment is probably what one can call a half-
truth because it is a statement that includes only some aspects that compound 
the framework in which the problem is inserted.  
In this chapter the historical causes that explain the presence of terrorist 
operatives in the Brazilian TBA will be analyzed.  Three factors are presented in 
this chapter as historical sources of the activities that link terrorism to the 
Brazilian TBA: the end of the Cold War, a former lack of stricter state efforts in 
the area, and Arab immigration. The first one is a global factor, whereas the other 




                                            
16 Rex Hudson, “Terrorist and Organized Crime Groups.” 
17 John Lombardi and David Sanchez, “Terrorism Financing and the Tri-border Area of South America,” 




A. THE CAUSES 
1. The End of the Cold War 
Terrorist groups, just like other organizations,18 need supporting efforts 
such as funding, logistics, and communications in order to reach their goals.  In 
other words, they need support to maintain their endeavors.  That support can be 
provided by different sources such as governments, the civil population, Non-
governmental Organizations (NGO’s), political parties, and criminal enterprises.  
The fact of the matter is that, in some way, they have to have sources of 
sustainment.  Rachel Ehrenfeld argues that, “Today’s global terrorism requires 
money for much more than individual attacks. An expanding terror network must 
have enough funds to support: 
 Recruitment 
 Training camps and bases 
 Housing and food 
 Equipment, explosives, and conventional and unconventional 
weapons 
 Forged identity and travel documents 
 Intelligence gathering 
 Communications among organizational components 
 Bribery 
 Day-to-day maintenance expenses of members awaiting 
commands to launch operations.”19 
Furthermore, John Picarelli and Louise Shelley assert that: 
In the past, the predominant source of terrorist financing was state 
sponsorship. The close of the Cold War and the international  
 
                                            
18 Richard L. Daft, Essentials of Organization Theory and Design (Cincinnati, OH: South-Western 
College Publishing, 2003). 
19 Rachel Ehrenfeld, Funding Evil. How Terrorism is Financed – and How to Stop It (Chicago and Los 
Angeles: Bonus Books, 2003), 1. 
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community’s increasing emphasis and agreement led to a decline 
in the number of potential state sponsors of terrorism as well as the 
overall amount of sponsorship. 
Concluding they say: 
New forms of financing have arisen to supplant these lost funds.  
Crime, specifically forms of organized crime (defined as crime that 
involves repeated activity involving more than two people), rose in 
prominence as a source of terrorist financing. Networks of terrorist 
cells cooperate to commit crime just as criminal organizations do.20 
 During the Cold War an external patron21 was one of the most 
important forms of support for terrorist groups.  For instance, the former 
Soviet Union used to sponsor terrorist groups around the world as a tool of 
statecraft.  Rachel Ehrenfeld affirms that: 
Most modern international terrorist organizations were trained, 
sponsored, and supported by the Soviet Union and its surrogates to 
help expand Marxism and Leninism. To them, Communist 
domination meant the absence of national boundaries and the 
presence of a globalized Communist world order. According to the 
Soviet Military Encyclopedia, their objective was to conduct 
unconventional warfare to subvert and destabilize the targeted 
nations. The Soviets trained the PLO and various nationalists 
groups in guerrilla and terror techniques, and used those groups to 
expand Soviet influence.22 
Once the Soviet Union imploded, the state sponsorship of terrorism 
decreased and lost its place as a primary source of support of terrorist groups.  
However, state sponsorship still remains; it is weaker, but alive.  Syria and Iran 
are important examples of states that support and use terrorist groups to achieve 
                                            
20 John T. Picarelli, Louise I. Shelley, Organized Crime and Terrorism, Terrorist Financing and State 
Responses in Comparative Perspective, ed. Giraldo and Trinkunas (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 2006). 
21 Peter C. Sederberg, “Conciliation as Counter-Terrorist Strategy,” Journal of Peace Research 32, no. 
3 (1995): 307. 
22 Ehrenfeld, Funding Evil, 7. 
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political ends in the international arena.  These countries, as Libya23 did in the 
past, have been harboring and helping terrorist groups. They provide 
sanctuaries24 (physical safe havens), resources (funds, weapons), training, and 
safe passage for terrorists.  David Tucker asserts that: 
Syria’s support of the Kurdish Workers Party is not coupled with 
direct demands on the Turkish government for specific concessions 
but rather is one of a number of tools used to shape a complicated 
political situation in Syria’s favor. This is also how the Iranians use 
the various terrorist groups they support.25 
Consequently, terrorist organizations could no longer depend only on 
states to support their activities.  Other sources of funding and logistic would be 
necessary to keep the terrorist groups able to develop their endeavors.  The 
solution came from the use of two different means: legal and illegal activities.  
Donations and charities26 on one hand, and criminal activities27 on the other, 
were the alternatives that terrorist organizations found to support themselves.  
Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas say that: 
The end of Cold War marked a watershed moment in the nature of 
terrorist finances. During the Cold War, terrorists were said to be 
heavily dependent on state sponsors for their funding, but became 
increasingly self-sufficient during the 1990’s, relying instead on 
crime and others self-financing methods.28 
                                            
23 Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Shrewd Sanctions. Statecraft and State Sponsors of Terrorism (Washington, 
D.C.: Brooking Institution Press, 2003), 173. 
24 U.S. Government National Security Council, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, September 
2006, 15. 
25 Tucker, Skirmishes at the Ede of Empire, 76. 
26 Evan F. Kohlmann, “The Role of Islamic Charities in International Terrorist Recruitment and 
Financing,” DIIS Working Paper No. 2006/7, Danish Institute for International Studies, 2006, 2. 
27 David E. Kaplan, “Paying for Terror,” U.S. News & World Report (December 5, 2005), 
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/051205/5terror.htm. 
28 Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas, “The Political Economy of Terrorist Financing,” in 
Terrorist Financing and State Responses in Comparative Perspective, (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 2006), 3. 
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Those new methods of terrorist financing29 drove terrorist groups to 
search the world for places that could provide other opportunities to support their 
endeavors.  The Brazilian TBA, formed by Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay, was 
one of those places chosen by terrorist groups in which to raise funding and 
manage logistics.  The Brazilian TBA “offered” conditions to terrorists, some 
historical and geographical, and some circumstantial, that allowed them to 
establish their supporting activities.  Such conditions were: a region with porous 
borders,30 a tri-border area with a circulation of thousands of people and 
goods,31 a lack of stricter state efforts,32 presence of criminal organizations 
involved in transnational crimes of smuggling and money laundering,33 and the 
presence of an Arab community34 free of discrimination and incorporated into the 
local community. 
2. The Former Lack of Strict State Efforts 
Any border area in the world is a challenge for the government in terms of 
control and security.  For instance, the United States of America (USA), which 
has borders with two different countries and an enormous apparatus of security 
and control, faces difficult problems involving illegal immigration,35 smuggling36 
and drug trafficking37 along its frontiers.  Paul Lunde, for instance, affirms that 
                                            
29 Giraldo and Trinkunas, “The Political Economy of Terrorist Financing,”3. 
30 Lombardi and Sanchez, “Terrorism Financing.” 
31 Rex Hudson, “A Global Overview of Narcotics-funded Terrorist and Other Extremist Groups,” Library 
of Congress, Federal Research Division, May 2002. 
32 Hudson, “Terrorist and Organized Crime Groups.” 
33 Philip K. Abbott, “Terrorist Threat in the Tri-Border Area: Myth or Reality?” Military Review, 
September-October 2004, 51.  
34 Maria Moreira, “Islam in Brazil,” http://www.islamfortoday.com/brazil.htm  [accessed July 27, 2006]. 
35 U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Illegal Immigration, Border-Crossing Deaths Have Doubled 
Since 1995; Border Patrol’s Efforts to Prevent Deaths Have Not Been Fully Evaluated,” August 2006. 
36 Ralph Vartabedian, Richard A. Serrano and Richard Marosi, “The Long, Crooked Line; Rise in 
Bribery Tests Integrity of U.S. Border,” Los Angeles Times (October 23, 2006), A.1. 
37 U.S. Federal News Service, Including U.S. State News, “Owner of House Used in Border 'Drug 
Tunnel' Pleads Guilty,” (Washington, D.C.), October 13, 2006. 
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“the Mexico-U.S. border is one of the most porous in the world.”38 In addition, 
The Los Angeles Times released the following report about some problems that 
the USA has faced along its borders: 
Bribery of federal and local officials by Mexican smugglers is rising 
sharply, and with it the fear that a culture of corruption is taking hold 
along the 2,000-mile border from Brownsville, Texas, to San Diego. 
At least 200 public employees have been charged with helping to 
move narcotics or illegal immigrants across the U.S.-Mexican 
border since 2004, at least double the illicit activity documented in 
prior years, a Times examination of public records has found. 
Thousands more are under investigation. 
Criminal charges have been brought against Border Patrol agents, 
local police, a county sheriff, motor vehicle clerks, an FBI 
supervisor, immigration examiners, prison guards, school district 
officials and uniformed personnel of every branch of the U.S. 
military, among others. The vast majority have pleaded guilty or 
been convicted.39 
Moreover, Paul Lunde claims that: 
Mexican organized crime handles the export of heroin, cocaine, 
and marijuana, as well as illegal immigrants, into the United States. 
The tremendous level of legitimate commercial traffic across the 
Mexican-U.S. border makes control of illegal activities difficult, as 
does the porous border, more than 1,875 (3,000 km) long.  Half the 
cocaine entering the U.S. comes via Mexico. In addition, the cross 
border trade in pirated and counterfeited goods has become 
extremely lucrative in recent years.40 
Hence, the TBA deals with problems that any other border area deals with 
around the globe.  Although the TBA’s geographical particularities explain part of  
                                            
38 Paul Lunde, Organized Crime: An Inside Guide to the World’s Most Successful Industry (London, 
UK: Dorling Kindersley, 2004), 25. 
39 Vartabedian, Serrano and Marosi, “The Long, Crooked Line,” A.1. 
40 Lunde, Organized Crime, 14. 
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the problem, they do not justify its reputation of permissive environment.41  
Rather, a lack of strict state efforts in the TBA explains its being a lawless area.  
Chris Zambeli asserts that: 
The Tri-Border Area (TBA) that binds Puerto Iguazu, Argentina; 
Ciudad del Este, Paraguay; and Foz do Iguaçu, Brazil, is another 
center of lawlessness and lucrative criminal activity in South 
America that includes Russian and Asian gangs, in addition to 
South American criminal syndicates. Hezbollah is reported to 
operate extensive operations involving fundraising and money 
laundering amidst the region’s sizeable Arab community in the 
TBA.42 
This lack of strict state effort is strongly related to the economic crisis 
during the 1980’s and early 1990’s, and the consequent acceptance of smuggling 
as an illegal but tolerable activity in a hard economic period.  The figure of the 
sacoleiros (small-time Brazilian importers43) rose in this period.  The sacoleiros 
are unemployed people or small businessmen that go to Ciudad del Este44 in 
Paraguay to import goods in small amounts with no payment of taxes.  Products 
like cigarettes, electronic goods, cameras, liquor,45 and perfumes are the typical 
goods smuggled by the sacoleiros into Brazil.  The problem is that organized 
crime saw how permissive the region was in terms of control of goods and 
people and started to use it to commit crimes such as drug trafficking, weapons 
trafficking, money laundering and credit card fraud.  The initial local 
permissiveness with smuggling attracted Russian, Chinese and Lebanese mafias 
to develop their criminal activities in the TBA, more precisely on the Paraguayan 
side of the tri-border. 
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One can affirm that Ciudad del Este has been the local area where 
criminal organizations established their headquarters to act in the TBA.  William 
W. Mendel asserts that: 
Paraguay - landlocked, poor, a long way from everywhere and 
seldom appearing in the drama of international events, is 
nevertheless emblematic of our global security challenge. It is a 
place having suffered crippling wars, where governance has always 
been a challenge, and where smuggling and criminal organizing is 
a tradition. Long disregarded by the intelligence and diplomatic 
services of the great powers, it is now a place where international 
crimes like money laundering, gun-running, drug trafficking, 
migration fraud, and terror-planning recombine and metastasize. 
Concluding he adds: 
Ciudad del Este, a boom town on Paraguay's eastern border facing 
Brazil and Argentina, is an appropriate target of our new concerns. 
Regional security scholars have aptly called it a nest of spies and 
thieves.46 
Moreover, Paraguay is not a Financial Action Task Force on Money 
Laundering (FATF) member and its legal, operative, and financial system is 
described as “underdeveloped.”47  Hence, Ciudad del Este has attracted criminal 
organizations as well as terrorist groups like HAMAS, Hezbollah and Al-Gama'a 
al-Islamiyya that are interested in fund raising, money laundering and safe 
havens.  Ciudad del Este, for instance, “generated US$12 to $13 billion in cash 
transactions annually as of 2001, making it the third city worldwide behind Hong 
Kong and Miami.”48  This situation contaminates the whole TBA, also affecting 
the Brazilian and Argentinean sides of the borders. 
However, the condition of lawlessness in the region is no longer applied to 
the whole area.  This reputation remains, unfortunately, as a paradigm, but it is 
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no longer unquestionable. Surely, as with any other border area, there are 
problems related to security in the TBA, but to sustain that the entire TBA is a 
paradise for criminals, terrorists and spies demonstrates a lack of knowledge 
about what is going on in the most important South American tri-border area. 
Important efforts have been developed to increase state strictness in the 
TBA.  The Brazilian government, for example, has enforced the law in the Triple 
frontier.  Brazil, in 2005 and 2006, inaugurated two modern regional offices for 
the Departamento de Policia Federal or DPF (Portuguese for Federal Police 
Department), and another one for the Secretaria de Receita Federal or SRF 
(Portuguese for Secretariat of Federal Revenues), which is the Brazilian customs 
branch.  Those new offices represent a great improvement in terms of security 
and control of people and goods that transit between Foz do Iguacu and Ciudad 
del Este.  The consequence is that the sacoleiros are disappearing from the 
Ponte da Amizade (Portuguese for Friendship Bridge), which links Brazil and 
Paraguay in the TBA; in addition, the circulation and even the presence of 
criminals has become much more difficult in the area. 
Moreover, to combat the problems related to activities that support 
terrorist groups a joint regional intelligence center sponsored by the Three Plus 
One forum that includes Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, plus the United States of 
America was created.  This center is located in the new DPF regional office in 
Foz do Iguacu and brings together officials from the three countries that form the 
TBA.  The U.S. Department of State’s Western Hemisphere Overview says that: 
Brazil hosted a meeting of the broad 3+1 group in December. 
Delegates reaffirmed their commitment to fulfill obligations outlined 
in UNSCR 1373 and to exchange information among governments. 
Additionally, the four countries reiterated the need to strengthen law 
enforcement ties by organizing a meeting for TBA public 
prosecutors in early 2006. Brazil agreed to fully implement the 
Regional Intelligence Center in Foz do Iguacu by mid-2006, and to 
invite Argentina and Paraguay to send official representatives to 
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staff it. The Three also agreed to implement joint patrols of Itaipu 
Lake and adjacent waterways and continue work on integrated 
immigration and border control.49 
In addition, Lombardi and Sanchez assert that: 
The “Three Plus One” is a sub-regional level counterterrorism 
security mechanism established by the three TBA countries in 
1998. “Three Plus One meetings (the three TBA countries plus the 
United States) serve as a continuing forum for counterterrorism 
cooperation and prevention among all four countries.50 
3. Arab Immigration 
The last historical factor that explains the presence of terrorist operatives 
in the TBA is Arab immigration to South America.  The three American continents 
have been a place of Arab migration beginning during the nineteenth century. 
The largest Arab community in the world outside the Middle East is in Brazil. 
“There are over 12,000,000 Brazilians of Arab ancestry. Of these 12,000,000 
Brazilian Arabs, over 9,000,000 are of Lebanese ancestry, making Brazil's 
population of Lebanese three times greater than that of Lebanon. Other 
Brazilians of Arab descent are mainly Syrian.  Moreover, the majority of Arabs in 
the Americas are not Muslim, they are Christians.”51 
The Arab community in the TBA is not really sizeable; it is only estimated 
at 12,000 to 70,000.52  When compared with the Arab community in Foz do 
Iguacu (300,000) and in Brazil (12,000,000), it is possible to state that in the TBA 
the Arab population is not substantial.  But the Arab Muslim community in the 
TBA, mostly of Lebanese and Syrian origin, served as an element of attraction 
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for terrorist operatives.  As the Arabs are integrated with the locals in the TBA, 
and do not suffer any kind of segregation or harassment, terrorist operatives 
could come to the TBA and infiltrate the local population. Howard Vicent Meehan 
asserts that: 
There is evidence that a percentage of the Lebanese diaspora in 
Ciudad del Este identifies with radical Islamic fundamentalist 
ideology consistent with Hezbollah’s rhetoric and ideology. A letter 
to Lebanese businessman Assad Ahmad Barakat from Hezbollah’s 
Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah thanking him for his financial 
contributions to El Martir obtained in an October 2001 police raid on 
one of Barakat’s many Ciudad del Este businesses indicates active 
fundraising operations by radical terrorists in the TBA.53 
In addition, terrorist operatives were attracted by the permissive 
environment that allowed the free circulation of people and goods through the 
triple frontier as well as the practice of crimes such as smuggling and laundering 
money.  Consequently, among the good and peaceful Arabs that immigrated to 
the TBA, there were people interested in making easy money raising funds and 
running logistics for terrorist groups. This money and logistics, coming from 
criminal endeavors, provided resources to the operations conducted by HAMAS, 
Hezbollah and Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya in the Middle East. 
B. THE PROBLEM 
Analyzing the historical elements that explain the presence of terrorist 
operatives in the TBA, one can affirm that the problem related to terrorism in the 
area is the nexus between organized crime and terrorism that allows terrorist 
groups to raise funds and run logistics to benefit their operations and operatives. 
Terrorist activities linked to radical Islamism in South America are 
generally associated with criminal activities.  Normally, these crimes are 
connected with clandestine phone communications, counterfeiting of passports, 
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identification documents (I.D.s) and international flight tickets, false marriages 
and child adoptions, drug trafficking, smuggling, money laundering, weapons  
traffic, and credit card fraud.  These criminal activities provide money and 
logistical support to terrorist organizations.  Hence, crime is the center of gravity 


























III. THE NEXUS BETWEEN ORGANIZED CRIME AND 
TERRORISM 
As demonstrated in Chapter II, organized crime is the center of gravity 
(COG) for terrorism in the TBA.  Hence, to better understand how the 
convergence of crime and terrorism54 works, and specifically how it works inside 
the TBA, this chapter will investigate the association between criminal activities 
and terrorism.  Consequently, this analysis will provide information and 
arguments to better comprehend how organized crime and terrorism come 
together in the Triple Frontier. 
In addition, a case study of a representative criminal organization that 
perpetrated its crimes in the TBA and had connections with terrorism is 
examined.  Then, its organization, leadership, and modus operand are analyzed.  
This case study comes about as a qualitative research tool that is applied to 
support the thesis hypothesis.55  It is a critical case that can be defined as having 
strategic importance in relation to the problem.  Moreover, when selecting the 
Panorama operation for case study, this thesis uses information-oriented 
sampling, as opposed to a random sampling. 
Organized crime is a kind of criminal effort that comes about as an 
organizational enterprise where criminal activities are carried out systematically 
by a formal criminal organization in order to raise profit.  This organizational 
structure differentiates this type of criminal activity from ordinary criminality, 
which occurs without any relevant organizational support.  R.T Naylor points out 
that: 
Common criminality is mostly associated with predatory crimes – 
burglary, armed robbery, ransom kidnapping, and the like – acts  
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that involve forcible or fraudulent redistribution of wealth, are 
episodic in nature, and require little long-term supporting 
infrastructure.56 
Furthermore, Paul Lunde claims that: 
Organized crime is an economic activity, and differs from street 
gangs like the Bloods and Crips, not just in the degree of 
organization and purpose, but because organized crime 
accumulates capital and reinvests it.  It is this that differentiates 
organized criminal groups from street gangs and “unorganized” 
criminals.57 
Therefore, it is this type of organized criminal endeavor that this thesis is 
concerned about, and it will guide the studies on the nexus between crime and 
terrorism. 
The connection between organized crime and terrorism is not particular to 
the TBA.  This melding of forces is a global tendency that can easily be found 
around the world.  David E. Kaplan, Bay Fang, and Soni Sangwan claim that this 
“new face of terrorism can best be seen in Western Europe.” Moreover, they 
continue, “crime is now the main source of cash for Islamic radicals in Europe.”58  
Terror experts Glenn E. Curtis and Tara Karacan point out that: 
The overlapping and cooperation of the activities of organized 
crime groups and terrorist groups has increased in recent years.  
Association of the two types of groups has occurred in three broad 
patterns.  The first pattern is alliances for mutual benefit, in which 
terrorists enter agreements with transnational criminals solely to 
gain funding, without engaging directly in commercial activities or 
compromising their ideologically based mission.  This arrangement 
normally has been the first form of contact between the two types of 
group.  The second pattern is direct involvement of terror groups in 
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organized crime, removing the ‘middleman’ but maintaining the 
ideological premise of their strategy.  The third pattern is the 
replacement of ideology by profit as the main motive for 
operations.59 
One can affirm that the crime-terror nexus60 is an alliance based on a 
convergence of interests.  The primary reason that drives terrorist groups to the 
criminal field is the necessity to obtain needed funds and services to support their 
operations and the terror organization itself.61  Terrorists are associated with 
crime in order to fund their terror activities.  Actually, crime can provide cash on a 
fast and regular basis for terrorist organizations, and criminal enterprises allow 
terrorist groups to diversify sources of funds and operate in the underground 
market.62  Terrorists are able to bankroll their endeavors with no dependency on 
popular aid.  In addition, Vladimir Kudryavtsev, Viktor Luneyen and Viktor 
Petrishchev state that “… modern terrorist structures cannot survive unless they 
rely on a powerful material and financial framework which often is fuelled by 
criminal businesses.”63 
The illicit endeavors, in which terrorist groups are commonly interested, 
are the ones that can provide them money, logistics, communication, transport 
and safe legal status.  Consequently, the most common crimes which link 
terrorism and organized crime are drug trafficking, clandestine phone 
communications, identity theft, sales of counterfeit goods, piracy, counterfeiting 
of passports and identification documents (I.D.s), smuggling, money laundering, 
weapons traffic, and credit card fraud.  In the words of John P. Sullivan: 
Organized crime and terrorism are related in complex and diverse 
ways.  Crime of many varieties is frequently used to fund terrorist 
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activity.  This may include smuggling, identity theft, sales of 
counterfeit goods (cigarettes, clothing, videos, etc.), illicit 
technology transfer, gems smuggling, piracy, high-tech crime and 
many varieties of fraud.64 
Additionally, he reveals: 
Money laundering is at the core of global organized criminal 
enterprise.  It is in this transaction or enterprise where terrorists, 
gangsters and other illicit actors are most likely to cooperate.  
These links sometimes mature into alliances of convenience.65 
Reinforcing the existence of these converging points that put gangsters 
and terrorists on the same path, Hayder Mili claims that: 
Since early 1990s, Western law enforcement agencies have noted 
an increasing reliance on criminal activity by terrorist networks 
around the world. Funding sources from the Persian Gulf, charities 
and other non-governmental fronts have been placed under 
pressure.  This development, compounded by the arrests of several 
high-ranking coordinators and financiers of operations in Europe 
and North America – such as Abu Doha and Fateh Kamel – have 
compelled jihadi networks to adapt and further diversity their 
funding sources.  Consequently ‘traditional’ criminal activities like 
drug trafficking, robbery and smuggling are rapidly becoming the 
main source of terrorism funding.  In fact, many recent terrorist 
attacks have been pertly financed through crime proceeds.66 
The attack on the Madrid metro on March 11, 200467 provides a useful 
example of a terrorist operation strictly financed by criminal activities.  The 
jihadists that conducted those attacks funded their operation with cash from drug 
trafficking.  The attack of the Madrid metro illustrates the deadly union of the 
crime-terror nexus.  In this episode, 191 people were killed in four blast zones; 
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another 1,741 were wounded.  One can affirm that this attack was the most 
devastating act of terrorism in European history, except for the 1988 bombing of 
Pam Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland.68  Kaplan, Fang, and Sangwan 
assert that: 
The terrorists behind the Madrid attacks were major drug dealers, 
with a network stretching from Morocco through Spain to Belgium 
and the Netherlands. Their ringleader, Jamal "El Chino" Ahmidan, 
was the brother of one of Morocco's top hashish traffickers. 
Ahmidan and his followers paid for their explosives by trading 
hashish and cash with a former miner. When police raided the 
home of one plotter, they seized 125,800 ecstasy tablets--one of 
the largest hauls in Spanish history. In all, authorities recovered 
nearly $2 million in drugs and cash from the group. In contrast, the 
Madrid bombings, which killed 191 people, cost only about 
$50,000.69 
A. ORGANIZED CRIME AS THE CENTER OF GRAVITY FOR TERRORISM 
IN THE TBA 
In the TBA, organized crime and terrorism converge.  This convergence is 
based on links between radical Islamic terrorist groups linked to the struggles in 
the Middle East, such as HAMAS and Hezbollah, and their supporting criminal 
activities.  In addition, there is no official information from any intelligence or law 
enforcement agency (national or international) that indicates the presence of 
terrorist operational cells or training camps active within the area.  Therefore, this 
connection between organized crime and the support of terrorist organizations or 
terrorist operatives is the typical terrorist activity in the TBA.  According to 
Salvador Raza: 
The principal terrorist activities in the Southern Cone are directly 
related not to the local societies, but to a deep-seated network of 
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organized crime and international terrorism, and the region is being 
used as a centre of support and fund-raising to finance these 
activities. 
Although in the past the revolutionary movements had the support 
of the national population of the countries where they were 
operating, and were deeply linked with the lives of the people and 
with those countries’ insertion in the world economy and politics, 
and were essentially a specific phenomenon but with important 
similarities to other groups from other areas, the terrorism now 
present in the region is not representative of that region.  
Although the old groups represented local society, or claimed to 
represent it, with its consent and support the terrorism now present 
in the region is marginal and represents other communities, 
particularly the Chinese mafia and Islamic extremist groups 
operating worldwide.70 
Actually, the reason that has driven terrorist groups to act inside the TBA 
is their interest to freely perpetrate crimes that can support their activities.  In 
fact, crime is the central element that has attracted terrorist groups like HAMAS 
to the Triple Frontier.  Within the TBA one can deduce that there is an equation 
where the presence of organized crime perpetrating illegal activities in order to 
support terrorist endeavors is the independent variable (IV), while the presence 
of terrorist groups linked to the Middle East conflicts is the dependent variable 
(DV).71  Thus, the hypothesis is that organized crime activities cause the 
presence of terrorist organizations in the TBA. 
Furthermore, one can use a graphic technique, such as the Venn 
diagram,72 to better illustrate the relationship between organized crime and 
terrorism in the TBA.   
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Figure 2. The relationship between organized crime and terrorism in the TBA. 
 
In Figure 2 the black circle represents terrorism and the white circles 
represent the TBA area (the largest) and organized crime (the smallest).  Here, 
terrorism and organized crime are inserted in the TBA living in a symbiotic 
relationship.  It is a commensalism,73 where terrorists and criminals “eat at the 
same table,”74 co-existing in the same space, and one organism (terrorism) 
benefits while neither harming nor helping the other (organized crime). 
Terrorist organizations simply wish to benefit from crime’s lucrative 
offerings.  Needless to say, if the conditions that attract organized crime to the 
TBA are terminated, terrorist groups will no longer be attracted to the region. 
B. CASE STUDY 
The following case study is based on unclassified reports.75 made by the 
Antiterrorism Service or SANTER (Portuguese for Serviço Anti-Terrorismo), an 
agency in the DPF.  Some of this thesis’ assumptions that are related to the case 
originated from inferences developed by the author.  Names of persons and  
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organizations that appear in this study were changed to preserve their identities.  
All individuals cited are facing judicial trials and are innocent until proven guilty in 
a court of law. 
1. Operation Panorama 
In the Brazilian corner of the TBA, a criminal organization had been 
carrying out illicit activities that could support individuals coming from the Middle 
East who had links with terrorism.  Information indicated that this organization 
developed criminal schemes based on false marriages and counterfeiting of 
identification documents (I.D.s), in order to provide certified documents and legal 
status (i.e., Brazilian citizenship) to illegal immigrants.  Later, it was discovered 
that the organization was partaking in other criminal activities, like clandestine 
phone communications, counterfeiting of international flight tickets, smuggling, 
and credit card fraud, providing money, communication and transport to those 
same illegal aliens. 
SANTER’s investigations exposed the organization’s two leaders: 
Mohammed and his nephew Ali, who controlled all criminal activities.  
Mohammed was the organization’s head and Ali was Mohammed’s right hand 
man.  Mohammed had a split personality.  The first was that of a respectful 
religious man (Islamic) who enjoyed popularity in the local community.  He was 
the owner of the Safe House Hotel as well as the owner of a jewelry store, the 
Golden 1000.  But Mohammed had a dark side as well. 
Information revealed that Mohammed was a Hamas operative acting in 
the TBA area in order to support Hamas’ terrorist purposes in the Middle East.  
Ali was a young man in his late twenties with no higher education.  Despite this, 
Ali was the manager of Mohammed’s Safe House Hotel.  Ali was the 
organization’s face; he handled the command and control of the cells, all under 
his uncle’s rule.  
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During the investigations, no operational terrorists were captured.  In 
fairness, the DPF acted promptly before the criminal structure could be used to 
support terrorists.  The crimes perpetrated by the criminal organization 
(CRIMORG) would aid terrorists linked to Hamas and its allies with logistics 
(money, shelter, and transport), communication and a Brazilian legal status.  
Consequently, the CRIMORG would be in the position to provide a safe haven 
for terrorists. 
However, Brazil for terrorists is neither a safe place nor a haven and the 
structure built by Mohammed and Ali was neutralized in June 2005 by SANTER, 
which launched Operation Panorama.  Panorama wiped out the entire 
organization.  Twenty one suspects, who had managed six different criminal 
schemes, were arrested.  Documents, computers, and counterfeiting tools were 
confiscated.  The whole criminal structure was erased.  In doing so, the 
CRIMORG was unable to provide any future support to other Hamas operatives. 
 
Figure 3. The criminal activities.   
 
The organization was divided into cells responsible for a particular sort of 














structure, each of which perpetrated the corresponding crimes as shown in 
Figure 3.  To better illustrate how the CRIMORG worked, the false marriage and 
credit fraud schemes are analyzed in detail. 
In the false marriage scheme, illegal Arab immigrants were married to 
Brazilian women who worked in Mohammed’s Safe House Hotel.  Those Arabs 
entered Brazil on a tourist visa and lodged in Mohammed’s hotel.  Mohammed’s 
primary objective was to assimilate the illegal Arabs into the Arab community.  
Then Mohammed helped the illegals acquire employment in the Brazilian Arab 
community.  After integration into the community, they began to play a role in one 
of the CRIMORG cells.  In general, the women who married the illegal Arabs 
were hard laborers.  Mohammed and Ali paid them an average of $1,000 US 
dollars to take the vows.  The women did not know who their “husbands” were, 
and were to maintain only a “professional contact” with them.  The objective was 
to provide the alien husbands a Brazilian background through marriage which 
would facilitate their process of Brazilian naturalization. 
Another pillar of this grand plot was a corrupt immigrant agent who, 
unfortunately, was a federal agent.  In June 2005, he was arrested with the 
others gangsters.  He had received money to confirm the legality of the marriage, 
and would attest, for instance, the Safe House Hotel’s address as the false 
couple’s legal residence.  Given that the organization was neutralized early, only 
four spurious marriages were committed. 
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Figure 4. False Marriage Scheme. 
 
In this scheme the false brides were Alice, Beth, Carol and Donna.  These 
women married Abdullah, Bilal, Majid, and Ali, respectively.  Even Ali benefited 
from this scheme.  Following the marriage, the women and the illegal Arabs were 
dismissed and did not see each other anymore.  When the illegal Arab alien got 
his Brazilian citizenship, his “spouse” would be ordered to file for divorce.  Figure 
4 depicts this example of the false marriage scheme. 
The second scheme involved credit card fraud.  This scheme was 
designed to provide illegal funding for the organization.  Stores belonging to Arab 
businessmen were used by the organization to steal costumer’s credit card or 
debit card personal identification numbers (PIN).  With those data, a fake credit 
card or debit card was made and used to withdraw money in automatic teller 















Ali obtained the electronic devices capable of stealing those data with his 
Arab partners, Amer, Baalbaki, Charaf, and a shadowy man known only as 
“Chris”; all four were specialists in credit card fraud.  Ali rented out the electronic 
devices to Arab businessmen to be used in their own stores, in order to pull in 
even more money.  The money stolen by the CRIMORG in this scheme was then 
shared between the store owners, the specialists and the organization’s core, 
namely Ali and Mohammed.  The stores involved in this scheme were Genius 
electronics and Millennia electronics.  The first belonged to Salif I, Salif II and 
Grace.  The second belonged to Salafi I and Salafi II.  Figure 5 depicts this credit 
card fraud scheme. 
 
Figure 5. Credit card fraud scheme. 
 
Using this scheme the CRIMORG had means by which to finance terrorist 
operations.  The organization could raise funds in the TBA, sending those funds 
to the Middle East in support of Hamas.  Another possibility was to provide 
money to terrorists hidden within Brazil who were illegal immigrants supported by 

















a. The Criminal Organization Analysis 
Analyzing the crime organization’s configuration, one can affirm 
that it was divided into parallel operating units.  Accordingly, there was a 
standardization of outputs. Each criminal cell was engaged in a specific kind of 
criminal activity, jointly contributing to achieve the organization’s overall 
objective: supporting HAMAS’ terrorist endeavors.  As noted earlier, the differing 
missions, which supported terror, included false marriages and counterfeiting of 
passports and I.D.s, credit card fraud and smuggling, clandestine phone 
communications, and the counterfeiting of international airline tickets.  
Observing these various missions, it is also possible to assert that 
the CRIMORG was configured in a divisionalized form.  Henry Mintzberg, famed 
organizational design guru, claims that: 
Organizations will sometimes be divided into parallel operating 
units, allowing autonomy to the middle-line managers of each, with 
coordination achieved through the standardization of outputs 
(including performance) of these units. The configuration called the 
divisionalized form emerges.76 
b. Organizational Purpose, Strategy and Effectiveness 
The CRIMORG had two overall missions.  Referenced above, 
Mohammed oversaw one of these two which consisted of providing legal 
Brazilian status to would-be terrorists as a means to support HAMAS terrorist 
activities.  The second, also discussed, involved fraud in an attempt to fill their 
coffers.  The purpose of these two missions was to achieve the following results:  
obtain Brazilian legal status, money, communication, and transport.  These 
outcomes brought money to the gangsters and enabled Mohammed to have the 
needed structure which would facilitate HAMAS. 
Mohammed’s strategy to achieve the organizational goals was to 
organize specialty cells, each with a different mission (i.e., crime).  Each cell did 
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not know the existence of the others. The link between the cells was Ali, who 
served as the organization’s supervisor; Mohammed was never seen.  His public 
image was preserved as a religious man and a businessman, and his commands 
were carried out by Ali. 
To analyze the performance of this crime organization, it is useful to 
apply the goal approach to organizational effectiveness.  In the words of Richard 
L. Daft: 
The goal approach to organizational effectiveness is concerned 
with the output side and whether the organization achieves its goals 
in terms of desired levels of output. 
The goal approach to effectiveness consists of identifying an 
organization’s output goals and assessing how well the 
organization has attained those goals. 
The important goals to consider are operative goals. Operative 
goals reflect activities the organization is actually performing.77 
Criminals, as a rule, are narrowly concerned with what they can get 
from their crimes.  They do not possess moral values nor care about society, 
their victims, or even their own partners.  They have but one objective: to acquire 
material goods.  Mohammed’s organization was no different.  What was 
necessary to do would be done. Money for the gangsters and support for 
Mohammed’s Hamas fellows overrode all decisions and actions.  Therefore, 
identifying and assessing the organization’s output goals are the best approach 
to measure CRIMORG effectiveness. 
Analyzing this organizational effectiveness using a goal approach 
perspective, it is possible to state that the DPF neutralized Mohammed’s 
organization because its outputs in a short period of time demonstrated that it 
was fully capable of assisting HAMAS terrorist operatives in the TBA area. 
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2. Command and Control 
Scott Snook states that “… whatever you divide, you have to integrate, 
coordinate or control.  The more one divides, the more effort required to 
coordinate or control.”78  There was no coordination between the cells.  They 
worked independently. As a rule, each cell did not know about the existence of 
the other one.  Their activities were compartmented to provide security.  Even if 
one cell was discovered, the others would be safe. 
At the same time, Ali maintained a structure of control.  He alone 
controlled the cells and executed Mohammed’s orders.  Unfortunately for 
Mohammed, this personal control was the factor which enabled SANTER to link 
all cells to Ali and, ultimately, to Mohammed. 
Mohammed was the capo of the organization.  Nevertheless, his 
command was undercover, and he observed a single channel through which to 
pass his orders.  He issued the commands and Ali executed them.  In fact, even 
Ali did not know the whole story about the aid to HAMAS’ operatives.  Primarily, 
Ali acted to make money and to help Arabs, like him, to start a new life in Brazil.  
Perhaps his ignorance about the strong links to terrorism, in which Mohammed 
was involved, put Ali in a fragile position.  Either way, he did not perform in a 
disciplined way in terms of security. Rather, he acted as a mere gangster.  He did 
not know that the crimes he and his partners committed were inserted into a 
context of terrorism linking South America and Middle East. 
3. Lessons Learned 
The analysis of Mohammed’s criminal organization draws some 
conclusions about investigations related to organized crime and terrorism.  The 
most important conclusion serves as a lesson learned for future police 
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operations: the existence of nodes that connect criminal cells are the weak points 
in a criminal organization supporting terrorism. 
In Mohammed’s organization, the weak point was his right hand man, Ali.  
Understanding Ali’s behavior and activities was the key point in uncovering the 
whole organization.  He acted as a business man and kept contact with all 
criminal cells trying to control the production of outputs of his partners.  
Moreover, he controlled those crimes with no notion that there was another 
reason beyond the money.  As a result, he did not act as a terrorist operative in a 
disciplined fashion.  Quite the contrary, Ali was seduced by the easy money and 
the advantages of his new financial status, buying new cars and spending his 
fortune in night clubs. 
This is a risk that terrorists must deny.  Their organizations are not “closed 
systems.”79  They depend on their environment in order to gain logistic support, 
communications and shelter.  Herein lies the principal lesson.  Security forces 
can catch terrorists and neutralize their schemes by investigating the connections 
between terrorist activities and criminal activities used to support terrorism. 
Surely, security issues are important to any criminal organization.  In its 
environment, it must guard against the efforts of law enforcement.  The challenge 
to a criminal organization is standardizing its security procedures. But this takes 
time.  Meetings, teleconferences, long phone conversations, and e-mails are 
measures that can bring fragility to the organization’s security.  For that reason, 
the organization’s leadership has to regulate security amongst the many cells.  If 
the law enforcement agency responsible for eradicating organizations begins its 
work quickly, the organization’s security structure will present crucial fragilities 
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IV. STRATEGIC LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE TO 
TERRORISM IN THE TBA 
As a rule, scholars and experts analyze the terrorist problem found in the 
TBA area by just pointing out well known problems80 and suggesting simplistic, 
common-sense responses.81  John Lombardi and David Sanchez, for instance, 
affirm that: 
In the final analysis, there is little doubt as to the strategic 
importance of the TBA.  The estimated numbers mentioned 
throughout this chapter illustrate the potential regional and 
international security threat resident in this permissive 
environment.82 
Concluding, they say: 
Better governance, free markets, a modern strategy to improve 
regional security, and clear communication of U.S. and Latin 
American interests are fundamental to combating terrorism and 
securing peace and prosperity in the hemisphere.83 
This is the typical proposition found that is related to responses to be 
applied in the TBA to combat terrorism.  Surely, these general propositions are 
necessary, but they are not sufficient to build a response that can bring about 
solid results in terms of suppression of terrorist activities in the Triple Frontier.  
Maybe these ideas are presented because the majority of analysts do not really 
know the TBA area, and they write their papers based on CNN-type reports or 
out-of-date papers, as well as common knowledge. 
Conversely, this chapter goes where just a few authors have gone before.  
It presents a feasible strategic response to combat terrorism in the TBA area.  
Based on the evidence presented in previous chapters, particularly the one 
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related to the terrorist problem found in the TBA area, the strategy that is 
developed in this chapter is framed in a law enforcement perspective. 
The essence of law enforcement is the maintenance of order and crime 
control.  These efforts are enhanced by criminal investigations and the arrest of 
suspects of crimes including murder, burglary, fraud and drug trafficking.  The 
police are generally concerned with accomplishing these overall missions.  
Surely, the nature and vocation of a law enforcement organization is based on 
the prevention and prosecution of criminal activities.  In James Q. Wilson’s 
words, “the average citizen thinks of the police as an organization primarily 
concerned with preventing crime and catching criminals.”84  However, if society is 
threatened as a whole by activities that are beyond ordinary crime, such as 
international terrorism, the police must play a new role and extend their mission 
to inhibit terrorist activities inside the homeland. 
Before the attacks in New York and Washington,85 terrorism was not a 
priority for federal law enforcement agencies, and not a concern for local police 
forces.  Western countries used to consider international terrorism as an issue 
that did not impact the homeland.  Consequently, even federal law enforcement 
agencies did not pay much attention to international terrorism within their 
borders.  Police investigations and operations were concentrated on the top 
issues of a law enforcement agenda, such as drug trafficking, bank robbery, and 
fraud.  Peter Chalk and William Rosenau, assessing the role of the police in 
counterterrorism efforts prior to 9/11, state: 
The FBI never developed a truly coordinated, systematic domestic 
counterterrorism intelligence capacity.  This was due in part to the 
bureau’s own stress on traditional, case-based criminal 
investigations, and in part to the on-going salience of national 
political context that was anxious to ensure the intelligence abuses 
of the past would not be repeated.  Over time, special agents 
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became reluctant to associate with any sort of “undesirables,” even 
when such sources could provide important information on 
terrorism.  As a result of these factors, human intelligence 
(HUMINT) was relatively underutilized tool within the FBI.  “Agents 
[did not] like a to go into mosques,” two journalists concluded 
recently, adding that the “so-called right of sanctuary was drummed 
into young FBI agents during their training at Quantico: ‘you don’t 
chase a thief into a cathedral.’”86 
But when the facts change, the conclusion must change as well.  Security 
agencies have learned that lesson the hard way.  The truth of the matter is that it 
took a tragic event involving thousand of deaths for law enforcement to change 
its approach to terrorism within the homeland.  Moreover, the grandiosity of the 
9/11 attacks showed that a national effort including local, regional and federal 
actors would be necessary to halt the terror threat.  Dan Verton affirms that: 
The attacks also prompted vast changes in the way U.S. law 
enforcement and intelligence communities work, the technologies 
they employ, the methods they use to cooperate with one another, 
and how they transfer information and knowledge. Legislation was 
passed that gave sweeping new powers to domestic law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies, while shifting the traditional 
balance of power away from the judicial branch in favor of a much 
more powerful executive branch.87 
The police, from the local sheriff’s office to the federal branch, play a 
strategic role in the so-called “Global War on Terror,” namely counterterrorism.  
This new law enforcement role is executed through police intelligence operations, 
covert investigations, information flow, sharing of databases, and permanent 
communication, coordination and collaboration (C³) between all security agencies 
involved in the fight against terror.  This approach creates conditions to establish 
a national counterterrorist structure that operates on a network basis to face 
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terrorism.  Working on counterterrorism, law enforcement agencies must work 
more closely with the intelligence community to generate strategic information in 
support of national security policies such as immigration and money flow. 
Inserted into this new and complex environment, the perspective of a law 
enforcement operation is broader than ever in its new homeland security role.  In 
Thomas O'Connor’s words: 
That partner known as law enforcement has always served a first 
responder role, and it even has some experience at counter 
subversive and anti-terrorist (domestic) activities, but today's 
challenge involves taking on enemies (modern international 
terrorists) who fight in asymmetric ways that mock constitutional 
safeguards which balance criminal rights with police powers. Law 
enforcement has also always been a small-town, decentralized 
phenomenon in American society, and without new models, 
theories, and laws, it may not be up to the task of collecting, 
sharing, coordinating, and analyzing the intelligence necessary to 
successfully assess and respond to modern-day threats. It may be 
time for a revolution in police affairs, much like the revolution in 
military affairs toward special, light brigades that are jointly 
coordinated in real-time.88 
In closing, he adds: 
It is definitely the time to reconsider the police role in society, and to 
what extent police involvement in national defense and domestic 
security carries a risk of encroachment on civil liberties.89 
The police force is the most capable instrument to combat terrorism within 
the homeland.  The police already have an efficient and effective structure 
working with personnel specialized in security and investigation.  The existing 
structure needs only be adjusted to add a counterterrorism branch.  This requires 
education, agent specialization, improvement of investigation methods and 
operations to combat terrorism.  Fortunately, the spirit and vocation to protect the  
 
                                            
88 O’Connor, “The integration of Homeland Security.” 
89 Ibid. 
 39
community is inherent in police forces.  Edward J. Tully and E.L. Willoughby, 
analyzing the role of local and state police agencies in US domestic 
counterterrorism, assert that: 
It is very important that our first line of defense against terrorism - 
the seven hundred thousand officers on the street - be given 
adequate training and background information on terrorism, the 
methods and techniques of the terrorists, and the likelihood of an 
imminent attack.  The reason this information should be shared, or 
available, is not so that state and local police can be involved in the 
investigation of terrorist cells, or individual terrorists, or collecting 
raw intelligence information.  Rather it is simply that these officers 
know their territory and are on the street 24 hours a day. 90 
They conclude saying: 
Considering that the terrorists who attacked the World Trade 
Center were stopped on several occasions by the local police prior 
to the attack for minor traffic violations, it is logical to assume that 
this pattern of random interception would continue in the future.  If 
and when similar situations occur, our local and state officers 
should have background knowledge by which to arrive at a 
reasonable suspicion.  Thereafter, the officers should have the 
ability to access national data banks to assist in the further 
resolution of the matter at hand.  This is a largely ignored but 
critical asset in our struggle to contain terrorism.91 
The police must improve intelligence efforts.  As a crucial piece on the 
homeland security chess board, law enforcement must develop investigations 
with a higher level of secrecy and extend its investigations to non-criminal 
activity.  In the words of O’Connor: 
Clearly, the purpose is to identify, halt and where appropriate, 
prosecute terrorists as well as those who provide them logistic.  It 
primarily involves a tracking mission for law enforcement, and only 
secondarily a prosecutorial mission, or bringing terrorists to 
justice.92 
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As shown in Chapter III, another actor is inserted into the international 
terror context that makes law enforcement efforts more relevant in 
counterterrorism initiatives, namely organized crime.  Here, organized crime and 
terrorism come together, and in a scenario like this, the police are the appropriate 
statecraft tool to combat terrorism. 
As a result, a strategic law enforcement response is the ideal one to lead 
the process of counterterrorism in the Triple Frontier area.  Here, a syllogism is 
necessary as reference to think about counterterrorist measures in the TBA:  
Crime is the center of gravity (COG) for terrorism in the TBA.  The best response 
to crime is effective law enforcement.  Therefore, law enforcement efforts are the 
best response to terrorism in the TBA.  Surely, these are efforts that must be 
applied in coordination and cooperation with other agencies like intelligence, 
financial intelligence units (FIU), and customs.  However, the primordial element 
that drives and leads the counterterrorist efforts in the TBA has to be law 
enforcement.  Moreover, these efforts must be conducted on all sides of the 
border, involving security agencies of Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay. 
A. THE ART LYKKE MODEL 
In order to establish the strategic counterterrorist role of Law Enforcement 
in the TBA area it is necessary to use a strategic theory to orient this effort.  
Harry Richard Yarger explains: 
Strategy is all about how (way or concept) leadership will use the 
power (means or resources) available to the state to exercise 
control over sets of circumstances and geographic locations to 
achieve objectives (ends) that support state interests. Strategy 
provides direction for the coercive or persuasive use of this power 
to achieve specified objectives.93 
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So, a strategy based on the three-element framework (Ends–Ways–
Means) will provide the directions that guide the police to the correct and optimal 
approach to combat terrorism in the Triple Frontier. 
Comprehension of the whole problem’s complexity (macro perspective), a 
well defined purpose, technological tools, consolidated techniques, highly 
qualified personnel, a budget proportional to the task’s size, and concepts of 
actions to achieve the objective will compound the framework that allows the 
police to present effective responses to terrorism.  Moreover, coordination 
between law enforcement and the intelligence community will be the crucial 
factor for success in this enterprise. 
 
Figure 6. Arthur F. Lykke, Jr. model. 
 
The Arthur F. Lykke, Jr. model94 (depicted above in Figure 6) has the form 
of a stool with three supporting bases, namely: (1) the ends, (2) the ways and (3) 
the means.  This model was inspired by the military, but has applicability in 
others areas such as homeland security and national defense. In the words of 
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Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., “this general concept can be as a basis for the formulation of 
any type of strategy – military, political, economic, etc., depending upon the 
element of national employed.”95  Harry Richard Yarger adds: 
It should be evident that the model poses three key questions for 
strategists. What is to be done? How is it to be done? What 
resources are required to do it in this manner? The stool tilts if the 
three legs are not kept in balance. If any leg is too short, the risk is 
too great and the strategy falls over.96 
Ends, ways and means must be kept in balance.  If the objective is 
pertinent and well defined, but there is no idea of how to achieve it, the objective 
is nothing else than a chimera.  Furthermore, if the objective and course of action 
are plausible, but there are no resources to support them, nothing will be done.  
This loss of balance happens when the risk, which is “the gap between what is to 
be achieved and the concepts and resources available to achieve the objective,” 
brings about failure to the strategy effort.  Yarger asserts that: 
Since there are never enough resources or a clever enough 
concept to assure 100% success in the competitive international 
environment, there is always some risk. The strategist seeks to 
minimize this risk through his development of the strategy--the 
balance of ends, ways, and means.97 
Lykke’s model will be used to sustain a law enforcement strategy to 
support their role in the counterterrorist effort in the Triple Frontier.  This strategic 
role of law enforcement is conducted on the premise that police act as the 
instrument of homeland security promoting counterterrorism.  To develop this 
effort, a framework of ends, ways, and means must be developed. 
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B. THE ENDS 
The overall goal of law enforcement conducting counterterrorist efforts is 
to halt the terror threat within its national borders.  But, it is not enough to be 
focused on terrorist organizations or Jihadis to combat terror.  Counterterrorism 
efforts must also be concerned with a large spectrum of activities capable of 
supporting terrorist endeavors. 
As an agency responsible for counterterrorism, the police must maintain 
the following objectives in the TBA: (1) prevent any terrorist activity; (2) inhibit the 
performance of individuals or groups that support terrorism; (3) neutralize 
criminals or criminal organizations that support terrorism; (4) suppress any 
activity related to terrorism that is already in progress; and (5) respond to any 
terror act in order to promptly identify its authors, their connections, and all 
nuances of the attack. 
This leg of the stool (ends) in the TBA has five faces: prevention, 
inhibition, neutralization, suppression and response.  These five missions have to 
guide the counterterrorist efforts in the Triple Frontier.  In order for the strategy 
be effective, all five objectives must be stressed. 
Of course, the police of the three countries must prioritize these 
objectives.  Even acting within their own borders, they can share information and 
knowledge, keeping their counterterrorist efforts in balance.  If just one or two 
countries stray from these aims, it will cause an imbalance in the whole strategy 
effort and there will be enough room for terrorists to act within the Tri-border 
area.  Hence, the individual strategies built in each country will form a grand 
counterterrorist strategy with common goals for the region.  Those objectives will 
drive the strategy and dictate what resources and concepts will be applied. 
C. THE WAYS 
The strategic course of action that enables the police to accomplish those 
objectives in the TBA area must permit a smooth process of investigation and 
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operation.  The rule of thumb is a planning guide that combines coordination, 
cooperation, and collaboration with sharing of information and knowledge 
between all agencies engaged in counterterrorism in all three countries. 
The accomplishment of the objectives will come about with identification, 
localization and obliteration of organizations or individuals suspected of terrorist 
endeavors.  The identification consists of knowing who the enemy really is.  In 
the sixth century BC, Sun Tzu wrote: 
So it is said that if you know your enemies and know yourself, you 
will not be imperiled in a hundred battles; if you do not know your 
enemies but do know yourself, you will win one and lose one; if you 
do not know your enemies nor yourself, you will be imperiled in 
every single battle.98 
Consequently, groups and individuals that are within the TBA area and 
have any kind of link with terrorism, and any organizations that support terrorism, 
must be monitored.  Their interfaces and networks have to be discovered, and 
their modus operandi must be well-known in order to anticipate their movements. 
Surely, an extensive database with information on those groups and 
individuals is needed.  Furthermore, this data has to be shared and accessed in 
real time by all security agencies on the three sides of the border, and spread 
among international security agencies.  The key here is coordination and 
cooperation efforts forming a protective network aware of any kind of suspect 
movement that might result in terror activities.  As stated by Phil Williams: 
Government and law enforcement agencies have to think and act 
much more in network terms; they need to develop the same kind 
of flexibility to operate both nationally and transnationally through 
the creation of informal transnational law enforcement networks 
based on trust that is exhibited by drug-trafficking networks.99 
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Finding suspects will be the consequence of a successful safeguarding 
network.  With the right information, at the right time, and shared in the Triple 
Frontier territory, determining the location of the terrorist suspects will be more 
likely accomplished. 
After confirming the terror connections and activities, the organization or 
individuals suspected of terrorism must be neutralized.  This neutralization 
consists of arresting all suspects and liquidating the apparatus used to plan the 
execution of terrorist endeavors to include documents, computers, and 
communication devices. 
But it is not enough to merely neutralize.  Actually, wiping out terrorism is 
a process that completes the breakup of all networks and connections that 
support terrorist activities.  If only the core and principal actors of a terrorist 
enterprise are neutralized, the structure will still be active and able to support 
terrorism or aid another terrorist operating cell. 
In order to develop those efforts, police forces in the TBA area can use the 
following model shown in Figure 7, which consists of a guide to investigate and 




Figure 7. Author’s model to investigate and neutralize terrorist organizations. 
 
This model permits synchronization between criminal investigations and 
police intelligence operations.  All processes start with information, which points 
to the possible existence of terrorist activities.  If there is an indication that 
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the other hand, if there is no indication of crime but the information indicates the 
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presence of suspects with the potential capacity for perpetrating terrorist 
activities, an intelligence operation will be initialized.  
The relevant factors in this model are coordination and cooperation 
between criminal investigations and intelligence efforts.  Coordination is stressed 
using: (1) mutual adjustment, which is based on the simple process of informal 
communication; (2) standardization, achieved on the drawing board with 
education and training; and (3) direct supervision, by having one person take 
responsibility for the work of others, issuing instructions and monitoring their 
actions. 
Furthermore, the police intelligence unit promotes the link between law 
enforcement and the intelligence community.  The basis of this relationship is 
coordination, cooperation and communication (C³), promoting the sharing of 
information and knowledge.  Consequently, the information produced by police 
investigations and police intelligence operations is shared with intelligence 
agencies both nationally and internationally. 
D. THE MEANS 
Leading counterterrorism efforts within the TBA, law enforcement 
agencies must be provided with the necessary resources to achieve their 
objectives.  The means available to execute ordinary law enforcement duties 
within the Triple Frontier are not sufficient to face counterterrorism efforts.  More 
resources (e.g., people, equipment, finances and facilities) are needed. Training 
and education are required as well.  Among all the elements that comprise the 
framework of resources that must be increased in order to develop the strategic 
role of law enforcement in the TBA, an increase of personnel has to be the most 
important.  Trained, motivated, and appropriately compensated law enforcement 
agents, who have experience and competence in crime prosecution, can carry 




domestic counterterrorism will be approached by police forces as simply another 
duty, and the necessary concern for this strategic issue for homeland security will 
not exist. 
One big step toward improving the means of supporting the 
counterterrorist strategy in the TBA was the establishment of the Intelligence 
Regional Office (IRO), within the Triple Frontier,100 which came about as a 
project developed by the “three plus one” forum. 
The IRO brings together the security agencies in law enforcement and 
intelligence from Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay, allowing a smooth process of 
coordination, collaboration and cooperation between them, in order to develop 
efforts to combat organized crime and terrorism.  The IRO should avoid any lack 
of interoperability101 between the security agencies within the TBA, stopping 
possible frictions related to interagency conflicts and strategic gaps that exist 
among the agencies.  In doing so, the IRO will grant synchronization to prosecute 
criminals and terrorists. 
E. THE RISK 
A strategy will be victorious if there is balance between its basic elements: 
objectives, ways and means.  This balance allows the strategy to: (1) obtain the 
desired effect; (2) have enough resources to accomplish the plan of action; and 
(3) establish a good cost-benefit analysis determining if the strategy is feasible.  
James F. Holcomb, Jr. asserts that: 
The definition of risk is the degree to which strategic objectives, 
concepts and resources are in or out of balance. Since strategy is a 
dynamic process, one must understand that all three elements are 
variable and subject to change over time. 
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Concluding, he affirms: 
The formulation of effective strategy for any endeavor is a constant 
quest to ensure balance among the variables. The definition applies 
to all aspects of strategy development whether dealing with national 
security (grand) strategy, defense, military or theater strategies, 
business strategy or even personal strategies.102 
Surely there are a considerable number of factors that can come about as 
risks for a strategy, such as political, bureaucratic and organizational dilemmas.  
However, the biggest risk that can bring about instability among objectives, ways, 
and means in the presented strategic framework is a gap between ways and 
objectives rising from lack of coordination, collaboration and cooperation among 
the actors that conduct the strategy in the Triple Frontier. 
If the actors involved in the strategy do not really interact, regardless of 
their internal culture and individual goals, in order to create a successful strategy, 
there will always be room for terror organizations to maneuver within the region.  
As a consequence, all efforts will be wasted if there is no interaction and 
reciprocity among the nations and their agencies involved in the strategic 
endeavor.  Moreover, all actors need to share what they know and cooperate 
with each other. 
The three countries that form the TBA must be aware that the 
convergence of their interests to combat terrorism in the Triple Frontier is 
necessary but is not enough to sustain a successful counterterrorist strategy for 
the area.  As a consequence, Brazil, Argentine and Paraguay need to implement 
measures to avoid or at least lower the risk.  In other words, continual processes 
of risk assessment and management are needed to optimize the strategic effort. 
The process of risk assessment is “the constant effort to identify and 
correct imbalances among the key variables.”103 So, it is necessary to recognize 
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when variables change.  On the other hand, risk management comes about as a 
means to adjust the remaining variables to account for the risk.  Hence, the TBA 
countries’ security agencies committed to the strategy must be able to: (1) 
reduce the overall objective to more realistic terms; (2) increase or relocate 
resources in order to better implement the strategy and achieve the objectives; 
(3) and use distinct tactical elements in different combinations with varying 
emphasis to include criminal investigations, such as financial investigations, and 
police intelligence operations. 
The Intelligence Regional Office (IRO) formed by Brazil, Argentina and 
Paraguay can be the one entity that is able to implement risk assessment and 
risk management in order to overcome any threat that can affect the strategy.  A 
branch within the IRO formed by representatives of the three countries will 
develop the assessments and management of the strategy.  This branch will 
promote, for instance, multilateral meetings to review the elements of the 
strategy, and make the necessary adjustments as a means to improve it.  In 
addition, this permanent forum will be a tool to shrink eventual historic rivalries in 
the region that make interstate cooperation difficult, promoting a smooth process 
of cooperation, collaboration and communication. 
Of course, there is always some level of risk inherent over any strategy.  
Actually, risk is immanent for any strategic effort.  Moreover, in a “complex 
environment”104 like the TBA, the risk is manifested.  In such a domain, many 
diverse external elements interact with and influence the actors involved in the 
strategy.  Security agencies from different countries, including law enforcement 
and intelligence, criminal organizations, and terrorist organizations all interact in 
the TBA.  Hence, that mechanism of assessment and management of risk is 
indispensable for strategists in the Triple Frontier in order to overcome possible 
troublesomeness.  In the words of Holcomb, Jr.: 
                                            
104 Daft, Essentials of Organization Theory, 55. 
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Once a strategy is developed, the most important strategic skill and 
the true mark of strategic “genius” is accounting for potential 
change and recognizing actual change in a timely enough manner 
to adjust the strategic variables and thereby ensure a valid strategic 
equation oriented firmly on achieving the political objectives at 
hand. This is increasingly difficult to do in a dynamically changing 
strategic environment with myriad threats, challenges, actors and 
























                                            































Because it is a strategy or a tactic, terrorism can be found any place 
around the globe.  It has many faces, different causes, and comes about in 
distinct ways.  One can say that it is like the fingers of a hand which have the 
same nature and can hold the same threat, but have different sizes, functions, 
and strength.  In the words of Donald J. Reed: 
As multiple sources have indicated, “terror” is not the enemy. In the “war” 
on terror, neither terror nor terrorism can be defeated since terror is a 
method and terrorism is a tactic. From this perspective, neither terror nor 
terrorism takes on the characteristics of entities that can be defeated in 
the traditional sense.106 
In the Philippines there are terrorist groups inspired by Islam and 
Communism, such as the Abu Sayyaf Group and the New People's Army. In the 
Middle East terrorism is linked to groups that fight for the liberation of territories 
occupied by Israel, such as HAMAS. And in Colombia, there are narco-guerrillas 
who hide their criminal efforts behind a revolutionary flag, like the FARC. 
In the Tri-Border Area, terrorism also has its own characteristics.  In that 
area there are no training camps or operational cells, and there are no groups 
fighting against any regime.  Between the Tropic of Capricorn and parallel 30 in 
South America, terrorist attacks do not occur. The problems related to terrorism 
in the TBA are connected with the struggle between Arabs and Israelis in the 
Middle East.  Terrorist groups that wage that “cosmic war,”107 such as Hezbollah 
and HAMAS, have operatives in the TBA to raise money and provide logistics to 
support their groups. In addition, these supporting activities are, as a rule, 
criminal efforts. 
                                            
106 Reed, “Why Strategy Matters.” 
107 Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence, 
(Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 2003). 
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So, if terrorism has so many different faces and ways of expression, the 
responses to it must be as distinct as terrorism itself.  There is no magic solution. 
There is no general response that can be used to stop terrorism in all places of 
the globe.  In each country, terrorism has a different level of threat, and 
sometimes there is no threat at all.  As a consequence, in some places military 
actions are the best response for terrorism, as when insurgents use terrorism as 
a strategy.  But, in other places, the best tools of statecraft to combat terrorism 
are intelligence and law enforcement efforts. 
Each nation needs its own response to terrorism that fits with its security 
needs and strategy.  It must be a local solution linked to a global counterterrorist 
effort.  In other words, the local authorities, who are the ones strongly touched by 
the threat, must lead the efforts to combat terrorism in their territories, and these 
efforts must be harmonized with the will of the international community.  Then the 
response is local, rooted in local security demands; but, at the same time, it 
comes about globally since it is inserted in an international counterterrorist effort 
by coordination, cooperation and communication with international security 
agencies. 
In the TBA, the best statecraft instrument to combat terrorism is law 
enforcement.  In the Triple Frontier, crime is the center of gravity for terrorism, so 
law enforcement agencies are the most capable to deal with this situation.  They 
can better prosecute organizations and individuals that perpetrate crimes to 
support terrorist groups.  Surely, this is not a struggle of a lonely army.  The 
police should lead the process of prosecution, but it might be done in 
coordination with other security agencies.  Financial investigation units (FIU), 
customs agencies, and intelligence agencies must come together with the police 
to develop successful counterterrorist efforts. 
The three countries that form the Tri-Border Area must develop a strategic 
approach to combat terrorism.  A law enforcement strategy based on ends, ways 
and means, with emphasis on police intelligence operations and covert criminal 
investigations is the best response to terrorism in the TBA.  The strategy must be 
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developed by the three countries that form the TBA with full cooperation, 
collaboration and communication among their security agencies. 
In addition, the strategists involved in the TBA counterterrorist strategy 
must be aware of the risks that can affect the strategic effort.  Different kinds of 
risks can touch that strategy.  They can hit the three-element framework (ends, 
ways and means) in different ways, causing discrepancies among them.  
Otherwise, the most relevant risk that can bring about instability in such strategy 
is the absence of coordination, collaboration and cooperation among the TBA 
security agencies engaged in the strategy.  This risk can cause derangement 
between the strategic ways and objectives.  James F. Holcomb, Jr. affirms that: 
The essential elements of strategic risk are unchanged through the 
ages and consist in the proper balancing of ends, ways and means 
to achieve the desired strategic outcome. Understanding that 
fundamental relationship and “guessing well” through study, 
exercise and experience will ensure that assessing and managing 
strategic risk rises above simply “the comfort level of strategic 
planners.” 108 
As a consequence, the governments of Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay 
must implement efforts in order to deal with possible risks that can affect the 
strategy.  A feasible alternative to overcome risks is to use a tool of risk 
assessment and management.  Risk assessment and management can identify 
and correct imbalances among the strategic key elements and adjust them to 
overcome the risk.  That instrument can be a branch in the Intelligence Regional 
Office (IRO) in the Triple Frontier comprised of representatives of the three 
countries focused on the optimization of the strategic effort.   
So, the IRO will be an instrument used to make the necessary 
adjustments in the strategy in order to make it better.  Besides, the IRO will 
promote more interaction among TBA security agencies putting away rivalries in 
the region, and allow for an easier process of cooperation, collaboration and 
communication.  The IRO will be a permanent forum that will put at the same 
                                            
108 Holcomb, Jr., “Strategic Risk,” 199. 
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table the actors responsible for the security in the TBA, interacting as a means to 
ameliorate the counterterrorist strategy in the Triple Frontier. 
Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay’s governments must be involved in the 
counterterrorist endeavors in the TBA.  Terrorism is not a problem just for one or 
two countries in the region.  It is a problem that is found on the three sides of the 
border and affects the security, reputation and economy of the three countries.   
Security is obviously affected because the presence of terrorist groups, 
even with no operational cells, creates a convergence of people with bad 
intentions. Those people go to the TBA to perpetrate crime to support terrorist 
activities.  The economy is affected because the TBA is a place where tourism is 
one pillar of the local economy,109 and tourists do not want to share the space 
with terrorist operatives.  The area’s reputation is logically affected because the 
presence of terrorist groups in the region stigmatizes the area as a place that 
provides safe heaven for terrorists. 
So, there is no room for unilateral or bilateral counterterrorist actions in the 
TBA.  Every counterterrorist measure in the TBA must be multilateral, including 
the three countries plus the international community. 
In conclusion, this thesis is a magnifying lens over the TBA area, showing 
the real dimensions of the terrorist problem in the Triple Frontier.  It aims to 
promote an analysis of the problem, free of intellectual bias, and based on the 
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